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We study the interaction of multiple large economies in dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium. Each economy has a monetary policy-
maker that attempts to control the economy through the use of a linear
nominal interest rate feedback rule. We show how the determinacy of
worldwide equilibrium depends on the joint behavior of policymakers
worldwide. We also show how indeterminacy exposes all economies to
endogenous volatility, even ones where monetary policy may be judged
appropriate from a closed economy perspective. We construct and dis-
cuss two quantitative cases. In the 1970s, worldwide equilibrium was
characterized by a two-dimensional indeterminacy, despite U.S. adher-
ence to a version of the Taylor principle. In the last 15 years, worldwide
equilibrium was still characterized by a one-dimensional indeterminacy,
leaving all economies exposed to endogenous volatility. Our analysis
provides a rationale for a type of international policy coordination, and
the gains to coordination in the sense of avoiding indeterminacy may
be large.
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1.1 Policy-induced endogenous volatility
It has been widely documented that the 1970s and early 1980s were charac-
terized by substantially more macroeconomic volatility than the later 1980s
or the 1990s in the major industrialized economies.1 In an inﬂuential paper,
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) explored the possibility that the earlier
era might be viewed as a sunspot equilibrium induced by poor monetary
policy. Their empirical results suggested that U.S. policymakers did not
obey the Taylor principle2 during this era, and their theoretical ﬁndings
suggested that failure to obey the Taylor principle can be associated with
indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibrium and the possibility of
sunspot equilibria. Under this interpretation, the volatility observed during
the 1970s was facilitated by poor policy.3
A natural question is how the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) analysis
may be altered in an open economy setting. With several large economies in-
teracting, determinacy of the resulting world equilibrium hinges on the joint
actions of world policymakers. It is not very clear a priori how the determi-
nacy conditions might be inﬂuenced by the nature of policy in each of the
countries, the nature of the economic interactions between the economies,
or the relative size of the economies involved. Our principle goal in this
paper is to explore an international version of the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000) argument. We use one of the recent extensions of the standard New
Keynesian model to multiple, large industrialized economies. We seek to
understand how the monetary policies in the various economies impinge on
the determinacy of worldwide equilibrium.
In the closed economy literature, indeterminacy of rational expectations
equilibrium has been viewed as an outcome to be avoided if at all possible.
1See, for instance, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), van Dijk and Sensier (2004),
Doyle and Faust (2005), Kim and Nelson (1999), and Stock and Watson (2003).
2For a discussion, see Woodford (2001, 2003).
3A related view, but one we do not explore in this paper, is the expectations trap
hypothesis of Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998).
1This is because indeterminacy is associated with the existence of, at least po-
tentially, quite volatile rational expectations equilibria in which the volatility
is unrelated to the fundamental disturbances buﬀeting the economy.4 We
take the same view of the worldwide equilibrium studied in this paper. But
because there are multiple policymakers in the international setting, we are
also interested in the implications that might be drawn for international
monetary policy coordination. The coordination can be designed, in our
setting, primarily to avoid indeterminacy of worldwide equilibrium.
1.2 Main ﬁndings
We begin by showing how determinacy of worldwide equilibrium depends
on the joint behavior of the world’s policymakers in the model. We are able
to relate the conditions for determinacy that apply in the open economy
setting to certain conditions that are available from related closed economy
analyses. We ﬁnd that the open economy setting puts a relatively sharp up-
per bound on how aggressive each policymaker can be in its policy rule with
respect to inﬂation deviations in order to remain consistent with determi-
nacy. This ﬁnding is consistent with some of the related small open economy
literature and suggests that analyses of major industrialized economies in
closed economy settings–surely the bulk of the analysis to date in the large
and rapidly growing New Keynesian literature–may be misleading from
the perspective of the discussion of which types of monetary policy rules are
consistent with equilibrium determinacy.
We are interested in the idea that policymakers in a large economy may
be able to take a simple unilateral action to guarantee determinacy of world-
wide equilibrium. For example, the monetary authority in a large economy
might be able to adopt a policy rule of a speciﬁcs o r tt h a te ﬀectively co-
ordinates expectations worldwide and renders worldwide equilibrium deter-
minate, even in a situation where monetary policy in partner economies
would be, by itself, inappropriate for generating a determinate worldwide
4See Woodford (1999, pp. 67-69) for a statement of this problem.
2equilibrium. However, we ﬁnd that in the model we study, the scope for
one country to take a simple unilateral action to guarantee determinacy of
world equilibrium is limited. It can be done, to be sure, in certain situations,
but generally speaking if a foreign economy is pursuing a policy suﬃciently
inconsistent with determinacy, domestic policymakers would have no sim-
ple options that would render worldwide equilibrium determinate.5 Instead,
they would have to suﬀer with indeterminacy and the potential for endoge-
nous volatility, or try to persuade the policymakers in the foreign economy
to change their approach to policymaking. One may have the intuition, as
we did, that policymakers in a large economy could adopt policies and in-
ﬂuence macroeconomic adjustment to shocks in such a way as to avoid the
worst types of exposure to endogenous volatility, but such is not the case
in the economy we study. We discuss this and related results further in the
main text.
When worldwide equilibrium is indeterminate, all countries are exposed
to endogenous volatility. We are interested in understanding how this volatil-
ity plays out across the world economy. We simulate sunspot equilibria for
several calibrated, three-country cases, and verify the extent to which en-
dogenous volatility originating in one country can be transmitted across bor-
ders in each case. The dimension of indeterminacy can be as large as nine
in a three country model, a clear change from the closed economy analysis.
This means that multiple sunspot processes can be operating simultaneously,
and in this sense the world economy can be exposed to endogenous volatil-
ity originating from many sources. We ﬁnd that even economies in which
policymakers pursuing what may be viewed as an appropriate policy–a
policy rule consistent with determinacy when viewed from a closed economy
perspective–are exposed to additional volatility in the sunspot equilibrium.
Those pursuing inappropriate policies fare even worse. This ﬁnding sug-
gests that policymakers from large economies running what appears from a
5In the class of models we study, leading examples of policies “suﬃciently inconsistent
with determinacy” include a policy rule which is too close to an interest rate peg, or a
policy rule which is too aggressive with respect to inﬂation deviations from target or the
output gap.
3closed economy perspective to be very reasonable monetary policies may still
have much to fear from the potential for endogenous volatility worldwide.
This concern would be especially pronounced in cases where a large part-
ner economy was pursuing a monetary policy inconsistent with worldwide
equilibrium determinacy.
The model we analyze is not rich enough to match international data in
a completely convincing way,6 but in keeping with the provocative analysis
of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), we end the paper with a consider-
ation of some empirical estimates of monetary policy rules for the three
largest economies in the 1970s, an era sometimes associated with indeter-
minacy, and in the 1990s, an era often described approvingly as being as-
sociated with better monetary policy worldwide. Using these estimates,
our global perspective suggests that the earlier era was characterized by a
two-dimensional indeterminacy in the worldwide equilibrium. The U.S. can
actually be viewed as following a rule conducive to equilibrium determinacy,
but still, because the partner countries were not, the world equilibrium would
still have been indeterminate, leaving the U.S. as well as all other countries
exposed to endogenous volatility. For the more recent era, worldwide equi-
librium is characterized by a one-dimensional indeterminacy, so that the
world economy is still exposed to endogenous volatility. Our point is to
emphasize that calculations like these would clearly depend on joint policy-
maker behavior in the large economies, and may not be evaluated eﬀectively
in a closed economy model.
Finally, we stress the implications of our ﬁndings for concepts of in-
ternational monetary policy coordination. The theoretical, fully optimal
cooperative worldwide monetary policy has been worked out for the model
we use.7 But our paper is written from a positive perspective, and our em-
pirical ﬁndings suggest that not every industrialized country has employed
at each moment in time a monetary policy rule consistent with determi-
6For open economy estimates based on a richer model, see Lubik and Schorﬁede (2005).
Our model has the virtue of collapsing to the standard, simple version of Woodford (2003)
when one of the economies is large and closed.
7See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002).
4nacy of worldwide equilibrium. Some have, to be sure, but others have not,
and according to our estimates the major economies we look at have not si-
multaneously pursued policy suﬃcient to induce determinacy of worldwide
equilibrium. One implication may be that the world’s policymakers should
not be content to let each large economy pursue monetary policy unilaterally.
As we show, coordination in our model most likely means direct discussions
with foreign policymakers in an attempt to convince them to follow a policy
rule which will, in joint operation with other monetary policies, generate a
unique rational expectations equilibrium worldwide. Viewed from this per-
spective, the gains from international monetary policy coordination may be
large.
1.3 Recent related literature
We are not the ﬁrst authors to study indeterminacy in an open economy
setting. A number of papers have addressed determinacy issues and the
connection to monetary policy for small open economies. De Fiore and Liu
(2005) study a small open economy version of Cooley and Hansen (1989).
They ﬁnd that monetary policy rules associated with determinacy in the
closed economy may not be associated with determinacy in the open econ-
omy. We have similar results for our model with large economies interact-
ing. The De Fiore and Liu (2005) ﬁndings contrast with earlier work by
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) for a small open economy, which suggested
that determinacy conditions were largely unaﬀected by trade openness. But
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) did not have the terms of trade eﬀects that
play an important role in De Fiore and Liu (2005) and in the present paper.
Zanna (2003) also works in a small open economy setting, in continuous time
and under alternative assumptions relative to the present paper. He ﬁnds
that the degree of openness and the degree of exchange rate pass-through
are key factors for generating a determinate equilibrium under a given mon-
etary policy rule. Linnemann and Schabert (2004) work in continuous time
as well and with a somewhat diﬀerent small open economy model. They
also ﬁnd that equilibrium determinacy generally depends on the degree of
5trade openness.
Batini, Levine, and Pearlman (2004) discuss indeterminacy issues in a
symmetric two-bloc model related to ours. The model used by Batini, et
al., (2004) is a more elaborate, two-country version of the n-country model
we use. The focus of Batini, et al. (2004) is to use root-locus methods
to analyze how equilibrium determinacy is related to the forecast horizon of
policymakers that react to expected inﬂation alone with policy inertia. They
ﬁnd, as we do, that there is an upper bound on how aggressive policymak-
ers can be if the goal is to generate determinacy of worldwide equilibrium,
and they also argue that longer forecast horizons tend to be associated with
indeterminacy. The forecast horizon is ﬁxed at one in our model to main-
tain comparability to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). The related paper
by Batini, Justiniano, Levine, and Pearlman (2006) contains an analysis
of optimally robust monetary policy rules in a closely related environment.
Bullard and Schaling (2005) discuss both determinacy and learnability in
a two country model similar to the one used here, but from a purely theo-
retical perspective, and considering a wide variety of monetary policy rules,
including targeting rules and situations of asymmetric policy. Also, we do
not examine the learning issue in this paper. For a closed economy analysis
of that question, see Honkapohja and Mitra (2004).
There is a large literature on international monetary policy coopera-
tion. Benigno and Benigno (2006a), for instance, work in a context similar
to the one used here, and show that in general there are theoretical gains
from international policy cooperation. This type of result also occurs in
our model, as discussed by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). Benigno and
Benigno (2006b) discuss strategic aspects of monetary policy cooperation,
showing how the optimal cooperative allocations can be implemented when
each country follows an inﬂation targeting regime. Similar themes are con-
tained in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002). They study a symmetric two-country
model related to the one in this paper, and ﬁnd plausible conditions under
which the Nash equilibrium of a game in which each participant is choosing
a monetary policy rule approximates the fully optimal cooperative equilib-
6rium. Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) also work in a model related to the one
in this paper, and ﬁnd that the degree of exchange rate exposure is a key
determinant of whether purely inward-looking policies or ones that involve
international cooperation are to be preferred.
There is also a large literature on the estimation of Taylor-type monetary
policy rules which we cannot eﬀectively summarize here. One related line
of research stems from Orphanides (2001), who has argued that monetary
policy rules should be estimated using only data available to policymak-
ers at the time that policy actions are being decided. Orphanides (2005)
re-estimates the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) policy rules using real-
time data. He argues that the real-time estimates are consistent with the
Federal Reserve abiding by the Taylor principle, so that there was no risk
of indeterminacy. We do not use real time data in this paper to obtain
our estimates across three countries and two time periods. However, our
baseline estimates are consistent with Orphanides (2005) for the U.S. in the
1970s, in that we obtain a suﬃciently strong reaction to deviations of in-
ﬂation from target that we would conclude that the policy rule in use was
consistent with equilibrium determinacy, if the economy was closed. The
two-dimensional indeterminacy we ﬁnd for this period is due to monetary
policy in the partner economies, not the U.S.
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) estimate closed economy, one-dimensional
sunspot equilibria directly based on subsamples of U.S. postwar data. We
think it would be interesting to apply this methodology to our multi-economy,
multi-dimensional setting. Belaygorod, Chib, and Dueker (2006) extend the
Lubik and Schorfheide closed economy analysis to a fully dynamic, full sam-
ple approach in which the economy can switch between determinacy and
indeterminacy. Beyer and Farmer (2004) discuss identiﬁcation in the Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004) context.
1.4 Organization
In the next section we present the model we use in this paper. We then
turn to a discussion of determinacy conditions for worldwide equilibrium,
7and we relate these conditions to analogous ﬁndings in closed economy set-
tings. In the subsequent section we explore how all variables worldwide can
be volatile as part of a sunspot equilibrium, even in those countries which,
from a closed economy perspective, are pursuing policies consistent with de-
terminacy of rational expectations equilibrium. In the ﬁnal section we turn
to estimates of policy rules in the spirit of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000).
We combine these estimates with a simple calibration, which suggests that
worldwide equilibrium was indeterminate in the 1970s and in fact remains
indeterminate today.
2E n v i r o n m e n t
2.1 An open economy new Keynesian model
2.1.1 Preliminaries
The new Keynesian model has been extended to the international context in
a variety of ways, and any of these extensions could be used for the purpose
at hand. We choose to use an n country version of the model of Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2002). This particular extension has several advantages
from our point of view. The chief among these is that the model collapses
to the simplest New Keynesian closed economy as a special case. We will
use this feature extensively to understand how determinacy conditions are
inﬂuenced by open economy considerations and to calibrate the model in a
way that can be related to existing, closed economy literature.
The model itself is not the focus of this paper. Our goal in this section is
to keep the paper self-contained by giving the reader suﬃcient information
to understand all of the main assumptions.
The world economy consists of n countries. We sometimes refer to coun-
try one as the domestic or home country, with the remaining n − 1 coun-
tries designated as “foreign.” Each country is populated by a continuum
of households indexed by h ∈ [0,1]. Households in all countries consume
diﬀerentiated goods produced by ﬁrms of all n countries. World population
is normalized to unity, and each country has a mass γj,j=1 ,...,n,where
80 ≤ γj ≤ 1, and
Pn
j=1 γj =1 . There is no population growth. Apart from
the potential diﬀerence in size (if γj 6=1 /n)a l lt h ec o u n t r i e sa r et h es a m e
in terms of preferences and technologies. Each country has a monopolisti-
cally competitive intermediate goods producing sector which uses labor as
an input. Nominal prices are sticky in the intermediate goods sector in the
sense of Calvo (1983). The number of intermediate goods producers in each
country is normalized to unity. The number of ﬁnal goods producing ﬁrms
in each country is equal to the number of households. Final goods producers
are perfectly competitive and take intermediate goods as inputs. We assume
the law of one price holds.
2.1.2 Households
Preferences Households live forever and maximize utility deﬁned over







































with σ>0, φ>0, and where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. In this
expression, C
j
t is an index of country j consumption and N
j
t (h) represents










for j =1 ,...,n,where Cj,k,t is the consumption of the ﬁnal good from coun-
try k consumed by households in country j at time t. The parameter γk,
k =1 ,2,...,n controls not only the size of a country but also its degree of
openness. If γk → 0 for all k ≥ 2, t h eh o m ec o u n t r yl a r g ea n dc l o s e d ,a l l
other countries are vanishingly small and open, and all consumers worldwide
consume the goods produced by the home country. If γk → 1 for some k,
then that foreign country is large and closed and all other economies are
9vanishingly small and open. The consumption index C
j
t is associated with








where Pj,k,t is the producer price of foreign good k in country j at time t,






Budget constraints The sequence of household budget constraints can
be expressed in nominal terms. Let W
j
t (h) represent the nominal wage as-
sociated with the labor supply N
j
t (h) of household h in country j.T h e
asset structure consists of complete, contingent, one period nominal bonds
denominated in country one currency. Let D
j
t+1 denote the country j con-
sumer’s holding of such a bond purchased at date t which yields a payoﬀ at
date t+1. Let ˆ Q
j
t,t+1 be the stochastic discount factor in country j. Finally,
let T
j
t denote lump sum taxes and Γ
j
t denote lump sum proﬁts accruing
from ownership of intermediate goods ﬁrms in country j. Then households




















for t =0 ,...,∞.
Labor supply In each country, each household faces a constant elasticity



























10is the associated aggregate wage index in country j. The elasticity of labor
demand, ηt, is the same across workers, but may vary over time. The ﬁrst-



















t =1 /ηt −1 is the optimal wage markup. Wages are perfectly ﬂex-
ible. We follow Clarida, Gali, and Gerter (2002) and allow for exogenous
variation in the wage markup arising from shifts in ηt, interpretable as ex-
ogenous variation in workers’ market power.8 Because wages are ﬂexible, all












for all h and all t.












































t denotes the gross nominal yield on a one-period discount bond in
country j, the inverse of the expected value of the stochastic discount factor.
8We have kept this feature for comparability but we do not use it in the analysis that
follows.
112.1.3 Final goods producers
Each ﬁnal goods ﬁrm uses a continuum of intermediate goods to produce













t denotes aggregate output in country j,w h i l eY
j
t (f) is the input
produced by intermediate goods ﬁrm f. Both variables are expressed in
per capita terms. Proﬁt maximization, taking the price of the ﬁnal good as






















2.1.4 Intermediate goods producers
Each intermediate goods ﬁrm produces output using a technology that is






where At is an exogenous technology parameter which is the same across all
countries and N
j
t (f) (normalized by population size), is the labor used by
each ﬁrm. It is a CES composite of individual household labor, where each















Intermediate goods ﬁrms set prices on a staggered basis as in Calvo (1983),
where θ is the probability a ﬁrm keeps its price ﬁx e di nag i v e np e r i o da n d
12(1 − θ) is the probability it changes it, where probability draws are i.i.d.











t denotes real marginal cost and τ percent of the wage bill is
the subsidy that each ﬁrm receives. Since in equilibrium each household
charges the same wage and supplies the same number of hours, we can treat
the ﬁrm’s decision problem over total labor demand as just involving the
aggregates Nt(f) and Wt.














subject to the demand curve (9). The solution to this problem implies that










j,j,t − (1 + μp)Pj,j,t+sMC
j
t+s)=0 (11)
where μp =1 /(θ − 1). The law of large numbers implies that the country j
price index evolves according to
Pj,j,t =[ θ(Pj,j,t−1)1−ξ +( 1− θ)(P0
j,j,t)1−ξ]1/(1−ξ). (12)
2.2 Equilibrium, monetary policy, and dynamics
2.2.1 Linearization
We follow Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and represent the equilibrium
of this economy in terms of logarithmic deviations from steady state values.
We let x =l nX, and write these equations as
˜ y
j























for each economy j =1 ,...,n,where u
j
t is the marginal cost shock in country
j. We supplement these equations with a policy rule determining the devi-
ation of the nominal interest rate from the level consistent with inﬂation at
target and output at potential, r
j
t, in the next subsection. In these equa-
tions, ˜ y
j
t is the output gap, π
j
t is the deviation of the producer price inﬂation
rate from a target set by the monetary authority. The parameters σj,o and
λj,o are conglomerates of underlying parameters, deﬁned as follows:
σj,o = σ − κj,o (15)
where κj,0 ≡ (1−γj)(σ−1). If γj → 1, which is to say that country j is large
and all other countries are vanishingly small, then κj,o → 0 and σj,o = σ,
which is as it would be for a closed economy. Also,
λj,o = δκj,j (16)
where
κj,j = σ + φ − κj,o,
and
δ =
(1 − θ)(1− βθ)
θ
.
Again, if γj → 1 so that κj,o → 0, the value of λj,o → δ (σ + φ) which is the
same as one would infer for the closed economy model.
The term rr
j
t is the country j natural real interest rate (conditional on
foreign output), given by
rr
j







where ∆¯ yj i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h eﬂexible price level of output in country
j, ∆ys is the growth rate of the level of output in foreign economy s, and
κj,s = γs (σ − 1).
142.2.2 Monetary policy
We specify the policy rule to be forward looking with interest rate smoothing.
We assume that each country pursues a Taylor-type rule featuring consumer
price index, or CPI, inﬂation. This is intuitively plausible as in an open
economy CPI inﬂation, not domestic producer price inﬂation, is often the
variable of interest for the monetary authority. We show that targeting CPI
inﬂation is equivalent to having a conventional Taylor-type rule augmented
by a third term which is the terms of trade. The monetary policy rule in




















∆sj,i,t the rate of change of the terms of trade between countries j and






r are the policymaker coeﬃcients on expected
consumer price inﬂation deviations, the output gap, and the lagged interest
rate, respectively. Using (18) in (17) implies that country j policymakers
eﬀectively respond to both the expected domestic inﬂation rate and to the

















In the special case where the country j economy is closed, CPI and domestic
inﬂation are equivalent and the domestic central bank simply responds to
domestic inﬂation.
The rule (19) can be further simpliﬁed. The terms of trade between





















t+1 − ¯ y
j
t+1, w ec a nr e - w r i t et h ea b o v ee q u a t i o ni nt e r m so f
























Rearranging the terms we obtain
∆sj,i,t+1 =( ˜ y
j
t+1 − ˜ yi
t+1) − (˜ y
j
t − ˜ yi
t)+(¯ y
j
t+1 − ¯ yi
t+1) − (¯ y
j
t − ¯ yi
t),
and letting ∆¯ sj,i,t+1 =( ¯ y
j
t+1 − ¯ yi
t+1)−(¯ y
j
t − ¯ yi
t) b et h er a t eo fc h a n g eo ft h e
natural level of the terms of trade between country j and i,
∆sj,i,t+1 =( ˜ y
j
t+1 − ˜ yi
t+1) − (˜ y
j
t − ˜ yi
t)+∆¯ sj,i,t+1.





















t+1 − ˜ yi
t+1) − (˜ y
j




This last term is the expected rate of change of output gap diﬀerentials be-
tween country j and all other economies, appropriately weighted by country
size. For the dynamic system, it will be convenient to rearrange and simplify










































Three countries We wish to apply the model to a three country world
setting. With the speciﬁed monetary policies, the general formulation of the










t is a 9 × 1 vector of free variables, X2
t is a 12 × 1 vector of prede-
termined variables,9 Ut is a 12 × 1 vector of fundamental disturbances, and





























































































9We follow Blanchard and Kahn (1980) in using this terminology.





































































































An autoregressive representation We follow Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) and Honkapohja and Mitra (2004). Let ηt+1 = X1
t+1 − EtX1
t+1, and








t + Ut+1 (21)








































The rational expectations equilibrium is determinate in the sense of Blan-
chard and Kahn (1980) if the number of eigenvalues of J inside the unit
circle equals the number of free variables (the dimension of X1). If instead
the number of eigenvalues inside the unit circle is less than the number of
free variables in the model, equilibrium is indeterminate.
Stationary non-fundamental equilibria We now write the system in
a form that characterizes non-fundamental equilibria. We will use this form
19to simulate some sunspot equilibria. Let matrix J be diagonalizable. Then





















































































t+1) and ¯ L = Q−1L.T h em a t r i xΛ∗
1 contains eigenval-
ues with modulus less than one whereas Λ
#
1 and Λ2 contain eigenvalues with
modulus greater than one. We exclude cases where the values lie on the unit
circle. The allocation of roots between Λ
#
1 and Λ2 is not unique but here we
follow the standard procedure and arrange eigenvalues in a nondecreasing
order of modulus.
Consideration of the ﬁrst and second blocks of equations gives us condi-































































For the ﬁr s tb l o c k ,t h a ti sp∗














































¯ ¯ ¯ < 1,E tp
∗,i
t+s →∞as s →∞unless
Etp
∗,i
t+s =0 . Hence the class of stationary solutions satisﬁes p
∗,i
t =0for all i,
which implies that p∗














¯ ¯ > 1,E tp
∗,i
t+s → 0 as s →∞and therefore we do not obtain any









































































3 Determinacy of worldwide equilibrium
3.1 Closed economy benchmarks
We begin by analyzing determinacy of worldwide equilibrium, focusing pri-
marily on how the determinacy of worldwide equilibrium is aﬀected by the
monetary policies of the various countries. This depends on the matrix J.
An analogous closed economy case with monetary policy inertia has been
analyzed by Bullard and Mitra (2006). They show that the necessary con-
ditions for determinacy with the forward looking policy rule10 are, in our
10In the monetary policy rule studied by Bullard and Mitra (2006), the central bank
targets domestic inﬂation, which would correspond to producer price index inﬂation in the
present model. But, in a closed economy there is no distinction between PPI and CPI.
21notation,
λ(ϕπ + ϕr − 1) + (1 − β)ϕy > 0 (25)
£
λσ−1 +2 ( 1+β)
¤
ϕr +2 ( 1+β) >σ −1 £
λ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 + β)ϕy
¤
(26)
if ϕy < 2σ−1 (see proposition 3 in Bullard and Mitra (2006)). In addition,
if ϕr ≥ 1, then the necessary and suﬃcient conditions are given by (26).
Some intuition for these conditions is available if we consider the case
of ϕy =0 , that is, the policymaker does not react to the output gap in
the policy rule. In this situation, given that λ>0, condition (25) becomes
ϕπ + ϕr > 1, am o d i ﬁcation of the oft-stated Taylor principle condition
that policymakers must react more than one-for-one to deviations of inﬂa-
tion from target in order to generate a determinate rational expectations
equilibrium.
However, because condition (26) must also be met, it is not suﬃcient
t ot h i n ko n l yi nt e r m so ft h i sm o d i ﬁed Taylor principle. Condition (26)
puts meaningful quantitative restrictions on what rules the policymaker can
adopt and remain consistent with determinacy of rational expectations equi-
librium. At baseline parameter values, including standard estimated values
for ϕr, Bullard and Mitra (2006) found that ϕy had to be relatively low,
less than about 0.5, and that there would be an upper bound on the value
of ϕπ, but that this upper bound was large enough that it would not be
relevant for policy discussions. If we use our baseline parameter values dis-
cussed below and assume the home country is closed, this upper bound on
ϕπ is approximately 44 when ϕy =0 . The upper bound actually increases
somewhat as the home country is allowed to be more open.
However, the Bullard and Mitra (2006) analysis was for a closed econ-
omy, and the determinacy condition by deﬁnition then refers to what, in
our model, would be producer price inﬂation. We have, more realistically,
included consumer price inﬂation in the monetary policy rule. This changes
the determinacy conditions, but in complicated ways, and only in the case
where an economy is somewhat open, since the closed economy case corre-
sponds exactly to Bullard and Mitra (2006). We use this fact to now turn
22to a numerical analysis of the determinacy conditions for the multi-country
model here. It will turn out that the upper bound on ϕπ with consumer
price inﬂa t i o ni nt h ep o l i c yr u l ea n do p e ne c o n o m i e sb e c o m e sm u c hs m a l l e r
and reaches levels that are relevant for policy discussions.
3.2 Calibrated values
We choose the calibration so that each economy collapses to the one stud-
ied by Woodford (2003) when the mass of the rest of the world tends to
zero. Woodford’s (2003) values have been widely used and provide a simple
benchmark. These values are β =0 .99,σ=0 .157,φ=0 .11, and λ =0 .024.
To obtain this last value when the rest of the world has zero mass, we note
that in this case λ = δ (σ + φ), with δ =[ ( 1− θ)(1− βθ)]/θ. Given other
parameters, this means that θ =0 .745 to obtain λ =0 .024. In a quarterly
model this means that intermediate goods ﬁrms can optimally reset their
prices about once per year on average with this value of the Calvo parameter.
3.3 Determinacy conditions
Figure 1 shows how the determinacy condition is altered relative to the
closed economy case with monetary policy inertia and a forward looking
rule as analyzed by Bullard and Mitra (2006). We use a three country
model, varying the country weights or openness parameters γ1,γ 2, and γ3.
In these calculations, we ﬁx the monetary policy rule in two countries and
allow the coeﬃcients on inﬂation deviations and the output gap to vary in
one country, while holding the coeﬃcient on lagged interest rate ﬁxed at
0.65. In the other two countries, the coeﬃcients on inﬂation deviations, the
output gap, and the lagged interest rate are 1.0, 0.2, and 0.65, respectively.
The ﬁrst panel has γ1 =0 .99, so that the economy is nearly completely
closed, and the determinacy regions compare favorably to the Bullard and
Mitra (2006) analysis.11 The other ﬁve panels in Figure 1 show how the
region consistent with determinacy is altered as γ1 decreases (with γ2 and
11See their Figure 2,m i d d l ep a n e l .
23γ3 equal to each other and increasing) making the home country more open.
The most interesting ﬁnding is that there is an upper limit on the reaction
to inﬂation which becomes more severe as γ1 is decreased, even if ϕy =0 .
The ﬁnal panel shows how the condition applies in the case where all three
countries are of equal size and hence equally open.
The upper limit on ϕπ comes from the interaction of open economy
considerations with the fact that policymakers are targeting consumer price
index inﬂation in this setting. The upper bound is sharp enough that it
might impinge on actual policymaker considerations. The advice coming
from the ﬁrst, closed economy panel is that monetary policymakers can
be as aggressive as they wish (there is an upper bound, but it is far from
actual practice) with respect to consumer price index inﬂation, and still
remain consistent with determinacy of equilibrium. A roughly realistic open
economy case might be the ﬁfth panel in the ﬁgure, in which the home
country produces half of world output, and two partner countries produce
one quarter each. But in this case, the degree to which policymakers can be
aggressive with respect to inﬂation is very limited, the upper bound for the
home country being on the order of 1.1 when ϕy =0 . This is a sense in which
open economy considerations may dramatically change one’s perceptions of
appropriate policy choices.
The calculations in Figure 1 primarily involve variations in the openness
parameters γi. If we ﬁx these country weights and set both ϕy =0 .2 and
ϕr =0 .65 for each of the three countries, we can calculate how coeﬃcients
with respect to inﬂation deviations interact internationally. We now turn to
this task.
We wish to interpret the γi as representing the share of world gross
domestic product. We want to consider two diﬀerent periods as discussed
by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), namely 1969-1979 and the more recent
era, 1990-2004. We use data that measures these shares using data from
the Penn World Tables12 based on purchasing power parity adjusted prices
worldwide. For the earlier era, we interpret the three countries as, in order,
12Summers and Heston (1991).
24Figure 1: Determinacy from the perspective of the home country. The
shaded region shows the policy rule parameter choices consistent with de-
terminacy, taking other countries policy rules as given. When the economy
is nearly closed (upper left), conditions correspond to those in Bullard and
Mitra (2006). As the economy becomes more open (lower right), policy
rules which are too aggressive with respect to inﬂation are associated with
indeterminacy.
25t h eU . S . ,G e r m a n y ,J a p a n . T h e s em e a s u r e si m p l yt h eU . S .s h a r ea s0.61,
Germany’s share as γ2 =0 .16, and Japan’s share as γ3 =0 .23. For the
later era, we interpret the three countries as, in order, the U.S., a uniﬁed
Europe under a monetary policy conducted by the European Central Bank,
and Japan. These measures imply the U.S. share as 0.46., the Euro area
share as γ2 =0 .36, and Japan’s share as γ3 =0 .18. There are certainly
other methods of computing these shares but we do not think it is critical
for the analysis we provide below.
Figure 2 shows the trade-oﬀ between monetary policy in the U.S. as
against the Euro area (Germany in the earlier era) and Japan. This ﬁgure is
somewhat diﬀerent from Figure 1 in that each axis represents a policy para-
meter from a diﬀerent country, whereas in Figure 1 both policy parameters
were from the same country. The shaded region represents the combinations
of policy parameters representing aggressiveness toward inﬂation deviations
in two countries that are consistent with determinacy of worldwide equilib-
rium.13 Perhaps the most striking ﬁnding from this picture, hinted at in
Figure 1, is that there are sharp lower and upper limits on the policy para-
meters of each country. This ﬁnding holds in both eras and with respect to
both (really, all three) countries. In particular, if the either the U.S., Japan,
or Germany/Euro area is either too passive or too aggressive with respect
to inﬂation deviations from target, world equilibrium will be indeterminate.
The idea that one country can unilaterally induce indeterminacy is not
borne out by Figures 1 and 2. There are policy rules which, if chosen by
one or another of the foreign policymakers, leave the domestic policymaker
unable to induce determinacy of worldwide equilibrium, at least within the
class of policy rules we consider. The relationship with respect to determi-
nacy between ϕπ in the home country vis-a-vis the two foreign economies
is not continuous. According to Figure 2, for example, adoption of a value
like ϕπ =2 .0 by just one of the countries will leave world equilibrium in-
determinate, and the other two policymakers will be unable to correct this
13We sampled 10,000 points randomly in this space to produce these ﬁgures.
26Figure 2: The trade-oﬀ between inﬂation aggressiveness in the home econ-
omy versus economies two and three, taking the remaining economy’s policy
rule as given, with openness weights from the 1970s (top) and the 1990s
(bottom). The shaded region is associated with determinacy of world equi-
librium. If the foreign policymaker is relatively aggressive, the home policy-
maker may be able to achieve determinacy by being less aggressive. But for
foreign policy choices ϕπ / 0.25 or ϕπ ' 1.5, the home policymaker cannot
make a simple adjustment to maintain worldwide determinacy.
27situation with unilateral action.14 We next turn to an investigation of the
implications of this ﬁnding for each country.
3.4 Transmission of sunspot shocks across borders
One may have the intuition that, even if world equilibrium is indeterminate,
ac o u n t r yw i l ln o ts u ﬀer if it follows a “good” policy, suitably deﬁned. In
this section we show that this intuition is generally not correct, especially if
the sunspot shock originates in a large country which is following a “poor”
policy from the point of view of determinacy of worldwide equilibrium.
To address this issue, we simulate sunspot equilibria with no fundamental
shocks to show the extent of transmission of sunspot shocks across borders.
We draw the shocks from a standard normal distribution. Each simulation is
for 60 periods, corresponding to approximately 15 years, and the volatilities
reported are for averages of 1,000 simulations. The results are reported in
Table 1. In the ﬁrst panel (panel A) all the countries are of equal size. For
column 1 of panels B and C we use the 1969-1979 weights for the three
c o u n t r i e s ,a n di nc o l u m n2 of panels B and C we use 1990-2004 weights.
We stress that any volatility for any variable in Table 1 below is coming
only from the sunspot shock, as there are no fundamental shocks. Because
the shocks follow a standard normal, the volatilities reported can be inter-
preted relative to a unit standard deviation for the driving sunspot process.
A number smaller than unity means that the variable is less volatile than
the driving sunspot process, while a number larger than unity means that
variable is more volatile.
We call the monetary policy rule of a given country determinacy-consistent
if it adheres to the modiﬁed Taylor principle ϕπ + ϕr > 1. Of course, given
the above discussion, it is not actually appropriate to think in terms of indi-
vidual country policies inducing determinacy of worldwide equilibrium, and
one could easily mis-characterize the situation by relying too heavily on this
14We think this lack of ability to inﬂuence worldwide determinacy conditions comes
from the relatively weak international interactions in this economy. When we say the
other policymakers are unable to correct the situation, we mean within the class of policy
rules we examine.
28simple principle. But for the calibration we are using and for the estimated
policy rules we discuss later in the paper, this characterization turns out to
be very useful. In particular, the dimension of indeterminacy of worldwide
equilibrium will always equal the number of countries following determinacy-
inconsistent policies for all of the quantitative cases we consider.
In all the three panels of Table 1 we assume that the coeﬃcients on inﬂa-
tion deviations, the output gap, and the lagged interest rate in the countries
following a determinacy-consistent policy are 0.9, 0.2, and 0.65, respectively.
In the country following a determinacy-inconsistent policy these coeﬃcients
are 0.2, 0.2, and 0.65. This “poor” policy rule is not aggressive enough to
induce determinacy of worldwide equilibrium when used in conjunction with
the other two policies. The size of the country following the determinacy-
inconsistent policy diﬀers across these panels. In all of the panels, A, B,
and C, the sunspot shock originates on inﬂation in the country following the
determinacy-inconsistent policy rule. In our simulations we found that if the
sunspot shock on inﬂation originates in countries following a determinacy-
consistent policy rule, then the sunspot volatility generated by these shocks
is not substantial.15
Panels A, B,a n dC, show that sunspot volatility is always transmitted
across borders in this model–fundamental shocks are null in these simula-
tions. Panel A suggests that the eﬀects are rather large for the output gap in
equally-sized countries. In this panel, there are no shocks of any type in the
U.S. or Japan, only a unit standard deviation sunspot shock in originating
on German inﬂation.16
The extent of this eﬀect, however, depends on the size of the coun-
try following the determinacy-inconsistent policy. When relatively small
15The sunspot shock could originate on any of the three variables in any of the three
countries. Multiple sunspot processes could be operating simultaneously as well. Thus
there are many possibilities, and we do not explore them all in this paper.
16The fact that all countries are aﬀected by sunspot shocks originating in a single
country helps address a criticism of the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) paper, namely
that the volatility of the 1970s was a global phenomenon, and that the likelihood of all
countries simultaneously experiencing a sunspot would be low (see, e.g., Nelson (2005)).
Simultaneous sunspot shocks are not necessary in this paper.




Output gap 1.40 3.12 1.40
Inﬂation 0.31 2.24 0.31
Interest rate 0.12 1.70 0.12
Panel B
1970s γi 1990s γi
U.S. Germany Japan U.S Euro area Japan
Output gap 0.77 2.70 0.06 0.67 0.49 2.71
Inﬂation 0.12 2.13 0.02 0.13 0.09 2.13
Interest rate 0.04 1.54 0.04 0.05 0.05 1.55
Panel C
1970s γi 1990s γi
U.S. Germany Japan U.S. Euro area Japan
Output gap 3.88 3.91 4.47 3.49 2.90 1.78
Inﬂation 2.38 1.02 1.14 2.32 0.64 0.43
Interest rate 1.94 0.38 0.37 1.81 0.20 0.21
Table 1: Transmission of sunspot shocks across borders. In Panel A, Ger-
many has the determinacy-inconsistent policy rule. In Panel B, the smallest
economy has a determinacy-inconsistent policy rule (Germany in the 1970s,
Japan in the 1990s). In Panel C the largest country (the U.S.) has the
determinacy-inconsistent monetary policy rule. The sunspot shock is on
inﬂation in the country with determinacy-inconsistent policy and follows a
standard normal process. There are no fundamental shocks. Entries in the
table are percent standard deviations, averaged across 1,000 simulations.
Volatility is transmitted worldwide, often with amplitude greater than that
of the driving sunspot process.
30countries–Germany in the 1969-1979 era and Japan in the 1990-2004 era–
are pursuing determinacy-inconsistent policies which allow the world econ-
omy to follow a sunspot equilibrium, the eﬀect on the other two economies
is mitigated, in the sense that the other two economies experience additional
volatility (above zero, which is the volatility of fundamentals), but less than
unity, the standard deviation of the driving sunspot process. This is shown
in panel B. This result is very compelling, as it is in accord with much in-
tuition that suggests eﬀects originating in relatively small economies should
not have undo inﬂuence on larger partner economies.
Panel C tells a diﬀerent story. If the largest country–U.S. in both
the eras–is pursuing the determinacy inconsistent policy and the world
subsequently coordinates on a sunspot equilibrium, then there can be large
spillover eﬀects on the relatively small countries. This is also in accord with
a great deal of intuition about the eﬀects of poor policy choices by large
countries.
We conclude that sunspot volatility is transmitted across borders in the
equilibria we examine, and that this eﬀect can be particularly acute when
the sunspot shock originates in a large country pursuing a determinacy-
inconsistent policy.
4 Evidence of postwar sunspot equilibria
4.1 Estimates of actual policy
4.1.1 Overview
We now follow Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and turn to estimation of
monetary policy rules for the three largest economies during the 1969-1979
era and during the 1990-2004 era. We wish to provide some evidence as to
whether the policymakers jointly satisﬁed worldwide determinacy conditions
in either the earlier era or the later era. We use quarterly data.17
17Estimates using similar methodology for an intermediate period, 1979-1994, across
Germany, Japan, and the U.S. are provided in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998). We do
not consider the 1979-1990 era in this paper, as discussed further below.
31We use the estimation procedure of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000)
to maintain comparability to the analysis there, except for two diﬀerences
which are important in our context. Clarida, et al., (2000) use a second-order
partial adjustment process of the actual interest rate and the central bank
reacts to the contemporaneous output gap. This policy rule is somewhat
altered from the one they use to calculate determinacy conditions. We follow
ad i ﬀerent speciﬁcation in order to keep our estimated policy feedback rule
exactly compatible with the policy feedback rule in our dynamic system.
Otherwise, we cannot be sure if estimated coeﬃcients are consistent with
worldwide equilibrium determinacy or not.18 To obtain compatibility, we
estimate policy rules in which the actual interest rate follows a ﬁrst-order
partial adjustment process and the central back reacts to the one-period-
ahead output gap. For estimation, the policy rule (17) can be rewritten as,












where rt is the actual nominal interest rate, πt,k i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation
between periods t and t + k , ˜ yt,k is the measure of the average output gap
between period t and period t + k, ϕr ∈ [0,1] is the interest rate smoothing
parameter, rr∗ is the real rate of interest, and π∗ is the inﬂation target. The
error term is then a linear combination of forecast errors and hence it is





(πt,k − Et [πt,k|Ωt]) +
ϕy
(1 − ϕr)




We let zt be variables within the central bank’s information set, and we
assume these variables are known when the central bank sets its interest
rate rt. We estimate a constant and the parameter vector (ϕπ,ϕ y,ϕ r) using
18Later in this section we present estimates of policy rules using the Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (2000) speciﬁcation, and check determinacy via the suitably altered dynamic
system.












are the same as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). We estimate four parame-
ters but the number of instruments in the set zt exceeds four which implies
some overidentifying restrictions that we can test.
4.1.2 Data
1969-1979 period The starting date of our sample is mainly driven by
data considerations and the end date is driven by the ﬁndings of Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000) that indicate a signiﬁcant shift in the U.S. monetary
policy around 1979. For the U.S.the interest rate is the average federal funds
rate in the ﬁrst month of each quarter. The annualized rate of change of
the consumer price index between two subsequent quarters is our measure
of inﬂation. The output gap is obtained by taking the deviation of log real
GDP from a ﬁtted quadratic trend. The instruments used in the estimation
are four lags of the federal funds rate, inﬂation, the output gap, the spread
between the long-term bond rate and the 3-month treasury bill rate, the log
diﬀerence of the spot commodity price index, and a constant.
The variables in zt for (West) Germany and Japan are somewhat diﬀerent
from the U.S. as detailed in the Appendix. For countries and time periods
with a non-seasonally adjusted CPI, we use percent change from a year ago
as a measure of inﬂation. For both Germany and Japan, we use the world
commodity price index instead of the U.S. commodity price index. We also
include the log diﬀerence of the real exchange rate, dm/dollar for Germany
and yen/dollar for Japan.
1990-2004 period In Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), the second era
is 1979-1996. We chose the 1990-2004 era in order to explore the seemingly
“passive” monetary policy rule in Japan and its implications for worldwide
equilibrium. In addition, instead of Germany, we want to estimate the
monetary policy rule for the Euro-area in this period. The U.S. data sources
33Table 2. Estimates for the 1969-1979 Period.
Country ϕπ ϕy ϕr Interpretation
U.S. 0.27 0.22 0.75 Determinacy-consistent
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Germany 0.30 0.46 0.58 Determinacy-inconsistent
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03)
Japan 0.14 0.04 0.80 Determinacy-inconsistent
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Table 2: Baseline estimates of monetary policy rules for the 1970s era suggest
a two-dimensional indeterminacy of worldwide equilibrium, even though the
U.S. policy may be viewed as reasonable taken in isolation. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
are the same as for the earlier era, but the data for Japan is slightly diﬀerent.
In particular, the CPI is seasonally adjusted, real GDP is chain-weighted,
and the interest rate and spread measures are based on better interest rate
data (see the Data Appendix for details). We use the IMF’s measure of world
commodity prices for the Euro-area19 and Japan. But since this series starts
in 1992, it reduces the sample size for both the Euro-area and Japan. The
Euro-area sample is even shorter since the interbank overnight rate begins
in 1994. Thus we have sample data beginning in 1990 for the U.S., 1992 for
Japan, and 1994 for the Euro-area. We think this is a good compromise in
trying to include as much data as possible but still restricting attention to
the period between 1990 and 2004.
344.2 Estimation results
4.2.1 Baseline estimates
The estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3 are based on the speciﬁcation of
the interest rate rule summarized by equation (27) with one lag of the in-
terest rate. The target horizon for inﬂation and output gap is one quarter,
k = q =1 .20 We estimate a constant and the parameter vector (ϕπ,ϕ y,ϕ r)
using GMM. In our estimation, the number of parameters we estimate is
less than the number of instruments we use, and so we check the validity of
the overidentifying restrictions by computing the J-statistic. Under the null
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are satisﬁed, the J-statistic
times the number of regression observations is asymptotically χ2 with de-
grees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions. The
p−values associated with this test for each economy in each era was always
large, 0.80 or greater, and so we do not comment further on these tests here.
We begin by discussing the estimated policy rule coeﬃcients and their
implications for determinacy of worldwide equilibrium. We then turn to a
discussion of the estimated constant term and the implications for implied
inﬂation targets in the three countries.
4.2.2 Interpretations for the 1970s and 1990s
To evaluate implications for worldwide equilibrium determinacy, we take
the estimates we have obtained by following the approach of Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (2000) at face value and combine them with Woodford’s (2003)
calibrated values in the dynamic system described earlier. We reach the
following conclusions.
19The Euro-area consists of 12 countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
20In Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), they also have a one period ahead target horizon
on the output gap. But according to their footnote 5, "...xt,q.includes GDP generated
between the beginning of period t and the beginning of period t+q (it includes periods t, t+
1,...and t+q−1). Having q =1 , then implies that the regression has the contemporaneous
output gap as a regressor in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). In this paper, we report the
estimation result for the case where one-period-ahead output gap is the regressor. This
matches our dynamic system.
35Table 3. Estimates for the 1990-2004 period.
Country ϕπ ϕy ϕr Interpretation
U.S. 0.08 0.07 0.94 Determinacy-consistent
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03)
Euro-area 0.21 0.11 0.91 Determinacy-consistent
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Japan −0.04 0.01 0.90 Determinacy-inconsistent
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 3: Baseline estimates of monetary policy rules for the 1990s era suggest
a one-dimensional indeterminacy of worldwide equilibrium, even though the
U.S. and European policies may be viewed as reasonable. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
First, in the earlier era, there would have been a two dimensional in-
determinacy of worldwide equilibrium. The U.S. policy was determinacy-
consistent, according to the estimates in Table 2, but the monetary policies
in Japan and Germany were not. Thus, indeterminacy characterized the
1970s, but not in the same way suggested by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000). Combined with the ﬁndings summarized in Table 1, this suggests
that a sunspot equilibrium, were it to have been followed, would have af-
fected the U.S., regardless of the origin of the sunspot shock. U.S. policy-
makers would have been buﬀeted by endogenous volatility, even though their
own policy seemed reasonable and the actual sunspot events were originat-
ing elsewhere. In addition, the indeterminacy is multi-dimensional, meaning
more than one process could be operating in equilibrium. The total quan-
titative eﬀect would of course depend on the variance of the sunspot shock
(which in principle could be arbitrarily large), and its correlation with fun-
damental shocks. Our Table 1 simply scales all variability to the scale of the
sunspot standard deviation, and considers a shock which has zero correlation
36with fundamentals.21
The worst-case scenario in Table 1 is one where the largest country is
following a determinacy-inconsistent policy, and then transmitting sunspot
volatility to its partner countries. According to these baseline empirical
estimates, this was not the case in the 1970s era.22 However, the alternative
estimates described below actually point to this worst case scenario.
In the later era, which is normally viewed approvingly as one where
monetary policy has been better, we still ﬁnd a one dimensional indeter-
minacy. The “poor” policy from a worldwide determinacy perspective is
coming from Japan. Thus according to these estimates there is scope for
endogenous volatility even in the current economic environment. However,
Table 1 suggests the eﬀect on the U.S. would be mitigated because the size
of the Japanese economy relative to the U.S. is small.
These results suggest that a global perspective is critical in evaluating
prospects for equilibrium determinacy.
4.2.3 Estimated inﬂation targets
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) showed how to identify a separate esti-
mate of the inﬂation target. We think these estimates are unreliable in our
samples, as we now discuss. The nominal federal funds rate is given by (27),
which is reproduced here for convenience











where the error term is given by (28). Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000)
wished to separately identify an estimate of the inﬂation target π∗. They
21We use the 1969-1979 time period following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), but
it might be viewed as inappropriate for Japan and Germany on the grounds that the
breakdown of Bretton Woods is included and may have had a larger impact on these
economies. We re-estimated policy rules for these economies using just the short sample
period 1973-1979 and found results were still consistent with a one-dimensional indeter-
minacy (the German policy now being determinacy-consistent). The short sample makes
these estimates less interesting, in our view.
22Countries like Japan and Germany certainly have smaller, tightly integrated trading
partners that could be aﬀected by their determinacy-inconsistent policy. We think this is
an interesting area for future research.
37Table 4. Estimates of π∗ given rr∗.
rr∗ π∗
Country 1969-1979 1990-2004 1969-1979 1990-2004
U.S. −0.03 1.55 25.88 6.35
(35.79) (15.79)
Germany/Euro-area 1.14 1.11 −0.45 2.47
(2.64) (0.19)
Japan −1.59 0.76 8.33 −0.57
(0.72) (0.08)
Table 4: Sample average ex-post real interest rates, expressed in percent,
along with inﬂation target estimates using the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000) methodology. If the modiﬁed Taylor principle holds exactly, the
inﬂation target estimate is undeﬁned. This nearly occurs for the U.S. in
both eras, producing unreliable estimates. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
used the following procedure, which according to our results does not change
the estimated coeﬃcients ϕπ,ϕ y, and ϕr. They viewed the sample average
ex-post real interest rate as a good proxy for rr∗. It is calculated by taking
the relevant sample mean of the federal funds rate and subtracting from it
the sample average of the annualized CPI inﬂation rate. Given rr∗,π   can
be estimated using the restriction implied by (29). The values for rr∗ as
well as the estimates of π∗ are reported in Table 4.
The inﬂation target estimates in Table 4 are sometimes far from what
seems sensible, such as the sample mean for the era, and in addition are
sometimes imprecisely estimated. There is a clear connection between these
instances and the determinacy conditions we have outlined above, which we
now illustrate using the U.S. case for the 1969-1979 era. When we estimate
(29) with a constant term, the value of the constant is −0.4259. The value of
rr∗ for this period is −0.03. The coeﬃcient estimates from Table 2 indicate
38that the modiﬁed Taylor principle narrowly holds, that is, that ϕπ + ϕr =
0.2673 + 0.7489 = 1.0162 > 1.23 Rearranging the constant term in (29) and
equating it to −0.4259 indicates that
π∗ =
−0.43 − (1 − ϕr)rr∗
(1 − ϕπ − ϕr)
=2 5 .88,
which is exactly the estimated value. In fact, if the modiﬁed Taylor principle
holds exactly, so that ϕπ +ϕr =1 , then the value of π∗ would be undeﬁned
in this calculation. If the estimates of ϕπ and ϕr should sum to slightly
less than one–which is certainly within the realm of sampling variability
according to these estimates–then the estimate of π∗ w o u l ds w i t c hs i g n ,
becoming large and negative. For this reason we expect unreliable estimates
of π∗ using the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) methodology when the
modiﬁed Taylor principle is close to holding exactly, as is the case for some
of the estimates given in Table 2 and 3 above.
4.2.4 Alternative estimates
Our econometric estimates have so far indicated that a two-dimensional
indeterminacy characterized the worldwide equilibrium in the 1970s, and
that a one-dimensional indeterminacy characterized the world equilibrium
in the 1990s. These results are based on a particular policy rule being used
by each country in each era. We can consider other policy rules, at some
expense since alternative policy rules change the nature of our dynamic
system. In this section we estimate the policy rules considered by Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000), assuming that each of the three largest economies
employed rules of this form. The Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) rule
has the monetary authority reacting to the current output gap instead of
our expected output gap, and allows for a second order partial adjustment
process in the nominal interest rate, but otherwise is the same. We keep
our speciﬁcation of consumer price index inﬂation, as opposed to domestic
producer price inﬂation, as the relevant measure of inﬂation in the policy
23For this calculation we use point estimates with four signiﬁcant digits to avoid signif-
icant rounding error.
39Table 5. Estimates for the 1969-1979 Period,
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) specification.
Country ϕπ ϕy ϕr,1 ϕr,2 Interpretation
U.S. 0.24 0.24 0.79 −0.08 Determinacy-inconsistent
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
Germany 0.24 0.38 0.56 −0.02 Determinacy-inconsistent
(0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Japan 0.10 0.02 1.17 −0.36 Determinacy-inconsistent
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Table 5: Estimates of monetary policy rules for the 1970s era using the
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) policy rule speciﬁcation suggest a three-
dimensional indeterminacy of worldwide equilibrium. Here the U.S. policy
m a yb ev i e w e da si n c o n s i s t e n tw i t hd e t e m i n a c y ,w h i c hi sav e r s i o no ft h e
reported results of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). This speciﬁcation
allows for a second order partial adjustment process in the nominal interest
rate, so that two coeﬃcients are reported. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
rule. This issue did not arise in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), as that
paper was a closed economy study.
The estimates reported in Table 5, which apply to the 1969-1979 era,
now suggest a three-dimensional indeterminacy of worldwide equilibrium.
The ﬁnding for the U.S., that a version of the modiﬁed Taylor principle,
namely24 ϕπ + ϕr,1 + ϕr,2 > 1, fails to hold, is consistent with the orig-
inal ﬁndings reported by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). However, in
worldwide equilibrium, all three countries are failing to meet this principle,
and when we check determinacy conditions, we indeed obtain a three di-
mensional indeterminacy. Again, sunspot equilibria could arise from many
24Here ϕr,1 and ϕr,2 refer to the coeﬃcients on the lagged interest rates in the policy
rule for t − 1 and t − 2 respectively.
40Table 6. Estimates for the 1990-2004 period,
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) specification.
Country ϕπ ϕy ϕr,1 ϕr,2 Interpretation
U.S. 0.12 0.01 1.58 −0.65 Determinacy-consistent
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04)
Euro-area 0.15 0.07 1.12 −0.22 Determinacy-consistent
(0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Japan −0.04 0.00 0.98 −0.08 Determinacy-inconsistent
(0.02) (0.01) (0.07) 0.06
Table 6: Alternative estimates of monetary policy rules for the 1990s era
suggest a one-dimensional indeterminacy of worldwide equilibrium, as in the
baseline speciﬁcation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
sources, and indeed multiple sunspots could be inﬂuencing worldwide eco-
nomic dynamics simultaneously. These estimates and the baseline estimates
for this era contained in Table 2 suggest that the dimension of indetermi-
nacy in the 1970s may well have been larger than one and that the era could
have been as volatile as it was due in part to self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations.
The alternative estimates reported in Table 6, which apply to the 1990-
2004 period, are similar to the baseline estimates contained in Table 3.T h e y
suggest, again, that while monetary policy was generally better during the
more recent era, there was still some risk of endogenous volatility due to a
one-dimensional indeterminacy in the worldwide equilibrium.25
25These alternative estimates can, using the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) method-
ology, be obtained along with an estimate of the implied inﬂation target. This would
again be subject to the caveat discussed above. For the sake of completeness, we report
this estimates here, with standard errors in parentheses. For the 70s, U.S. −0.54 (3.63),
Germany 3.08 (0.60), Japan 8.78 (0.24); for the 90s, U.S. 2.81 (0.50), Europe 2.51 (0.40),
Japan −0.59 (0.12).
415C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown how international monetary policy considerations impinge
on determinacy conditions for worldwide rational expectations equilibrium,
an international version of a famous result due to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000). Failure to achieve determinacy has been considered a severe short-
coming in the closed economy new Keynesian literature, and we view such
a failure the same way in the international context. The diﬀerence is that
in the international context, determinacy is inﬂuenced jointly, most impor-
tantly by the large policymakers on the world scene. We have considered a
simple, n-economy version of the new Keynesian model discussed in Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2002). This particular international version is certainly
not the only one available, but has the distinct advantage for us that it col-
lapses to the standard, simple new Keynesian model widely studied following
Woodford (2003) when any of the economies becomes completely closed.
Our analysis indicates that the degree of openness of each economy has
clear eﬀects on determinacy conditions, a ﬁnding that is consistent with
previous studies. We have shown how the closed economy case is consistent
with known ﬁndings from the literature, and also how these conditions are
altered as an economy becomes more open. We found clear upper limits
on how aggressive a policymaker can be with respect to inﬂation in the
monetary policy rule. This limit would exist in the closed economy case
but only at extreme values which would seem to be unlikely to impinge on
actual policy. One ﬁnding is then that policymakers for large economies
in this model can neither be too passive nor too aggressive with respect
to deviations of inﬂation from target if they wish to remain consistent with
determinacy of worldwide rational expectations equilibrium. We also explore
some of the tradeoﬀs that exist between the policy rule adopted by one
nation versus that adopted by another. We ﬁnd that there is little or no
scope for a large country to render the worldwide equilibrium determinate
via simple, unilateral action in cases where a partner country is pursuing a
policy suﬃciently inconsistent with determinacy.
42We have also investigated the extent to which sunspot shocks originating
in a single country may be transmitted across borders in a worldwide sunspot
equilibrium. The general ﬁnding is that all variables in all countries are more
volatile in such an equilibrium. The strength of this eﬀect depends on the
source of the sunspot shock, the degree of openness of each of the economies,
and the monetary policy rules in eﬀect in each economy. One generality is
that sunspot volatility originating in a relatively small economy following
a policy which is inconsistent with determinacy of worldwide equilibrium
has muted eﬀects on large economy volatility. Sunspot shocks originating
in a large country following a policy which is inconsistent with worldwide
determinacy, on the other hand, have large eﬀects on the partner economies.
Both of these results are in accord with a great deal of intuition about poor
policies being followed in large versus small countries.
In keeping with the original closed economy analysis of Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2000), we estimate monetary policy rules for three large economies,
and assess determinacy conditions for worldwide equilibrium using these es-
timates. We ﬁnd in our baseline estimates that the 1970s was associated
with a two-dimensional indeterminacy of worldwide rational expectations
equilibrium, and thus that endogenous volatility was a distinct possibility
during that era. Interestingly, the U.S. policy can be viewed as reasonable
according to these estimates, as a version of the Taylor principle is met. But
in conjunction with partner country policies in Germany and Japan, world-
wide equilibrium was indeterminate. For the more recent 1990-2004 era, we
ﬁnd a one-dimensional indeterminacy of worldwide equilibrium. Thus, while
policy has generally been better in the more recent era, the world economy
has still been exposed to the threat of endogenous volatility.
A long-standing debate in monetary policy circles concerns possible wel-
fare gains from international monetary policy coordination. At issue is the
extent to which policymakers in large economies such as the United States,
the Euro area, and Japan should adjust policy in reaction to economic events
outside their own borders. In the multiple country version of the new Key-
nesian model we study, each large policymaker can contribute, but only con-
43tribute, importantly to the determinacy of worldwide equilibrium. Failure
to ensure determinacy worldwide would open the door to unnecessary equi-
librium ﬂuctuations in the world rational expectations equilibrium. These
unnecessary ﬂuctuations, we have argued, would aﬀect all economies. The
poor macroeconomic performance potentially associated with indeterminacy
could reduce the welfare of households worldwide dramatically as the magni-
tude of the unnecessary equilibrium ﬂuctuations could, in principle, be quite
large. Policymakers in major economies may want to coordinate to avoid
such an outcome. This is a very diﬀerent reason for international policy
coordination than those that are normally advanced, but one that we think
may warrant further study.
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Appendix Table 1: Data for the U.S.
Series ID Source Description
Eﬀective fed FEDFUNDS FRED H:15 Selected
funds rate interest rates
CPI PCU@USECON Haver/BLS CPI-U, all items
GDP GDPH@USECON Haver/BEA Real GDP (SAAR,
Bil.Chn.2000$)
Short term FTBS3@USECON Haver/FRB 3-Month Treasury,
rate Secondary Market
(% p.a.)
Long term FCM10@USECON Haver/FRB 10-Year Treasury
bond rate Yield at
Constant Maturity
(% p.a.), nominal
Commodity PZALL@USECON Haver/CRB KR-CRB Spot




26Data on international liquidity, money and banking and international transactions
cover the former FRG and GDR beginning mid-1990. Data on prices, production, em-
ployment and national accounts refer only to the former Federal Republic of Germany.
49Appendix Table 2: Data for Germany
Series ID Source Description
Interbank C134IM@IFS Haver/IMF Germany: MMkt
overnight Rate: Interbank:
rate Overnight (%)
CPI CW34CZ Haver/OECD West Germany: CPI
@OECDMEI All Items
(SA, 1990=100)
GDP CW34GPCN Haver/OECD West Germany: GDP
@OECDMEI (SAAR, Bil.90.Euros)









Nominal C134ECME@IFS Haver/IMF Germany:
exchange Exchange Rate:
rate Market or Par
(EOP, DM/US$)
World C001CXAP IMF World: Commodity
commodity (discontinued) Price Index:
price All Commodities
(1995=100)
50Appendix Table 3: Data for Japan
Series ID Source Description
Interbank rate C158IM@IFS Haver Japan: MMkt Rate: Tokyo
overnight /IMF Overnight Call Money (%)
CPI C158PC@IFS Haver Japan: Consumer Prices
(1969-1979) /IMF (2000=100, NSA)
C158CZ@OECDMEI Haver Japan: CPI: All ltems Incl
(1990-2004) /OECD Imputed Rent (SA, 2000=100)
GDP GDP_95.Q.JA (69-79) Fame JAPAN — Real GDP
C158GDPC Haver Japan: GDP
@OECDMEI (90-04) /OECD (SAAR, Bil.Chn.2000.Yen)
Short term C158IDEP@IFS Haver Japan: 3-Month Unregulated
rate (1969-1979) /IMF Time Deposit Rate (%)
C158FRCD Haver Japan: 3-Month Certiﬁcates
@OECDMEI (90-04) /OECD of Deposit {Gensaki Rate}
(% per annum)
Long term C158IB@IFS Haver Japan: Yield to maturity
rate (1969-1979) /IMF of all ordinary Government
bonds (EOM, %)
C158FYGL Haver Japan: 10-Year Central
@OECDMEI (90-04) /OECD Government Bond Yield
(% per annum)
Nominal C158ECME@IFS Haver Japan: Exchange Rate:
exchange rate /IMF Market or Par (EOP, Yen/US$)
World C001CXAP (69-79) IMF World: Commodity Price Index:
commodity (disc.) All Commodities (1995=100)
price
C001CXAP@IFS Haver World: Commodity Price Index:
(1990-2004) /IMF All Commodities (1995=100)
51Appendix Table 4: Data for Euro-area
Series ID Source Description
Interbank C163ID@IFS Haver Euro Area+GR
overnight /IMF in 2001: Overnight
rate Interbank Rate (%)
CPI C025CZN Haver Euro Zone 12 {incl
@OECDMEI /OECD Greece}: CPI: Total
{OECD computation}
(NSA, 2000=100)
GDP C025GDPC Haver Euro Zone 12
@OECDMEI /OECD {incl. GR}:
GDP
(SA, Bil.2001.Euro)
Short C163IM@IFS Haver Euro Area+GR
term rate /IMF in 2001: Interbank
Rate: 3-Month
(% per annum)
Long term C163IB@IFS Haver Euro Area+GR in 2001:
bond rate /IMF Government Bond
Yield (%)
Nominal X111EXR Haver Euro Exchange
exchange rate @EUROSTAT /Eurostat Rate: U.S. Dollar
(Ave, USD/EUR)
World C001CXAP Haver World: Commodity
commodity @IFS /IMF Price Index:
price All Commodities
(1995=100)
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